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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARVIN L. WOODWARD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
CASE NO.
vs.
18089
MILDRED L. WOODWARD,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appeal from a portion of the Decree of Divorce
awarding respondent non-vested retirement benefits of
the appellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The parties were divorced on October 9, 1981.
Among other things, the Court, Honorable
VeNoy Christofferson presiding, awarded to the
respondent one-fourth of all proceeds which the
appellant will receive upon his retirement from Civil
Service, including the non-vested contribution of the
Government.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant respectfully requests this Court
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to set aside the award to respondent of that portion
of appellant's retirement benefits which are not
vested and which may be accrued in the future.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties' divorce trial was heard on
October 9, 1981 with the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson,
District Judge, presiding.

The Court entered its

decision awarding the divorce to appellant as well as
the custody of four minor children.

The appellant was

awarded the real estate and home which the Court
determined to have an equity of $40,000.00 after
deducting the costs of sale.

(R-70)

The appellant was also awarded two vehicles and
the respondent one.

The difference in their equity was

in respondent's favor in the sum of $2,000.00.

The

Court granted appellant one-half of this sum and
deducted it from the real estate equity, leaving a
net equity in the real estate of $39,000.00.

(R-71)

Of this amount, the respondent received an equity lien
against the real estate of $19,500.00, payable to her
upon sale of the home, the appellant's remarriage or
when the youngest qhild reached majority, whichever
occurred first.

(T-52)
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The only other asset of the parties was appellant's
Civil Service retirement.

Appellant had worked for Civil

Service for fifteen years, approximately the same length
of time as his marriage to respondent.

(T-52)

The Court

reasoned that since he would have to work another fifteen
years to obtain full retirement benefits, the respondent
would be entitled to one-fourth of his ultimate benefits,
in other words, one-half of the amount accumulated by
appellant during his marriage.

(R-72)

The Court included,

however, the share to be contributed by the Government
upon appellant's retirement, a sum which has not yet
vested in the appellant.

(T-75)

Also included by this

award would be the increase that appellant would earn in
future years by reason of promotions and other increased
pay benefits.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENT RETIREMENT
BENEFITS OF APPELLANT NOT YET EARNED OR VESTED.
In answers to interrogatories, appellant attached
a copy of his retirement plan for Civil Service.

(R 28-31)

From his plan it can be seen that:
1.

Given appellant's age, he cannot generally

retire until thirty years minimum service.

(See I)
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2.

His retirement annuity amount depends on

the highest salary obtainable by averaging his salary
for the highest five years of service.
3.

Appellant contributes to the Fund at the

rate of 6-1/2% of his basic salary.
also contributes to the Fund.
4.

(See III(l))

The Government

(See preamble to Plan)

If appellant terminates his employment

prior to retirement eligilibility, only his contributions
are refunded to him.

(See IX)

At trial, appellant testified that he had
approximately $17,500.00 in his retirement account,
all of which represented his own contributions.

(T-34)

At the conclusion of the trial, the Court awarded
the divorce to appellant and gave him custody of the
four minor children.

The appellant was also awarded the

home subject to an equity lien in the respondent for
$19,500.00 which represents one-half of the equity of
all the assets of the marriage, excluding the retirement
fund.

(R-71)
When awarding respondent one-fourth of appellant's

retirement pay, the following discussion occurred:
THE COURT:

As to the retirement, as I read this

chart on the options, he's been working fifteen years
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and has been married substantially for that period of
time, and under these is where you can discontinue
service after twenty-five, but you earn your full equity
after thirty years minimum service apparently, at any
age, no matter how old you are after you've had thirty
years.

So he can work his thirty years.

At this point,

I would assume he has vested interest in at least half
of that or fifteen of it.

So that the equity he has in

his retirement up to this point is one-half, his equity.
One-half of that one-half would be one-fourth, and this
one-fourth then, I'd grant an equity to the defendant
for one-fourth of the retirement as it is received.

Do

you understand what I mean by that.
MR. FLORENCE:

I understand what you mean by the

bottom, by the conclusion.

Are you taking the amount

that he has contributed to his retirement at the present
time and giving her one-fourth of that payable as it
is received by him?
THE COURT:

No.

I don't know what he will receive.

I don't know what options he'll take.
to take money, get out quicker.
more time and get more.

His option may be

His option may be to go

But whatever it is that he takes,

at this time I'm saying that her equity is one-fourth of
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that.

Suppose at such time as he does elect to retire

and take his retirement pay and say at that time -- I
don't know, say it's $1,200.00 a month.
her $300.00 of it.

He would pay

That one-fourth of it.

MR. FLORENCE:

If he works to the age of fifty

five and elects then to retire at that time, you are
awarding her a fourth of his retirement?
THE COURT:

His pay, uh-huh.

MR. FLORENCE:

Personal property

Your honor, so I'm not -- so

there's no misunderstanding on that, you are not then
awarding her a specific dollar amount in the retirement,
you are giving her a one-fourth interest in it, whatever
it may be?
THE COURT:

Whatever it may be as he receives

and it's paid to him.
MR. FLORENCE:

And that is in the form of a cash

settlement despite her condition at that time or her
position in life or her status?
THE COURT:

Well, yeah.

This isn't based on an

actual award of property.
MR. FLORENCE:

I appreciate that, but basically

what it appears to me is happening is that you are
awarding her a fourth interest in funds that he will
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receive and accumulate and work for in the next twenty
years.
THE COURT:

No, that's why I took half of it off.

She's not getting anything for the next half of what
he earns.
MR. HADFIELD:

He's saying a fourth of thirty

years is a half of fifteen years.
THE COURT:

See, I'm just giving her the ones

that he's accrued up to now.

He gets three quarters of

it and she gets one quarter.

What I'm saying is that half

of it he's going to earn after they're divorced.
entitled to all of that.

So he's

But I'm saying that she has

acquired an interest simply as a property interest in
what he's acquired so far, which is one-half of what it
will be, and her equity in that one-half is -MR. FLORENCE:

As I understand it, the Government

contributes to this only upon his retirement.

That's

only going to come in one paycheck, so if -- in other
words, when the amounts that appear in the exhibit, the
exhibit one are amounts that only he has contributed.
The Government matches that, so that when he ultimately
retires, they put in an equal amount that he has
contributed for the purposes of his retirement.

Now
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is she to get only one-fourth of his part of his
contributions
THE COURT:

No, I don't care whether you call

it matching by the Government or what, this is still
income to him and they're still matching what he has
already -- his income to him, whether they pay it
direct to him or pay it in the form of retirement.
MR. FLORENCE:

Well, I don't want to belabor

this, Judge, but I think it's important now that we
have it clear on the record.

If Mr. Woodward were

capable of retiring today, the $17,503.00, assuming
that that was the amount, would actually be matched by
the Government of an equal amount.

They would set up

an annuity for him totaling that $35,000.00.
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

MR. FLORENCE:

Now by your order then you are

entitling her to one-fourth of that that he will
receive, which includes the Government's participatory
share?
THE COURT:

Yes.

(T 71-75)

It is clear from the Court's order that
respondent is to receive one-fourth of appellant's
retirement pay which will include a matched share by
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the Government which is not yet vested in appellant.
Presumably over the next fifteen years, appellant will
continue to receive promotions and step increases in
pay so that his ultimate retirement pay (the highest
five years consecutive salary) will depend on his
employment at a time when he is not even married to
respondent.
Appellant has no objections to an award to
respondent of one-half of his presently vested
retirement amount.

That is the amount appellant would

receive if he terminated his government service now,
or $17,500.00.

Therefore, respondent would have a

right to $8,750.00.
Under the Court's plan, however, assuming that
appellant receives no further pay increases and
accumulates an identical amount through his own
contributions as have been accumulated in the last
fifteen years, he would have $35,000.00 accumulated
upon his retirement eligibility age.

This is then

matched by the Government so that appellant would have
a minimum of $70.00.00 from which an annuity could be
determined.

Respondent would receive one-fourth of

this or at least $17,500.00, the full amount of
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appellant's presently vested benefits.
This does not even take into account that
appellant's actual annuity amount is most likely going
to be determined by his work effort over the next
fifteen years when he is not married to appellant, and
yet she will share in those benefits.
In Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P. 2d 839

(1980),

this Court clearly held that it was error for the
District Court to consider any portion of plaintiff's
retirement fund contributed by the U.S. Government,
which had no present value, in making a property
division in a divorce.

(At 840)

It is submitted that Judge Christofferson, in
making the award to respondent, has allowed her to
share in an amount wnich has no present value and
which will include contribution of the Government.
CONCLUSION
The Court erred in awarding respondent a
portion of appellant's retirement benefits which are
not yet vested or earned.
DATED this 12th day of January, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,
FLORENCE AND' '\HUTCHISON
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BRIAN R. FLORENCE
Attorney for Appellant
818-26th Street
Ogden, UT
84401
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant,
postage prepaid, to Ben H. Hadfield, Attorney for
Respondent, 35 First Security Bank Building,
Brigham City, UT 84302, on this 12th day of
January, 1982.
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